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Abstract
Numerous exploits of client-server protocols and appli-
cations involve modifying clients to behave in ways that
untampered clients would not, such as crafting malicious
packets. In this paper, we demonstrate practical verifi-
cation of a cryptographic protocol client’s messaging be-
havior as being consistent with the client program it is
believed to be running. Moreover, we accomplish this
without modifying the client in any way, and without
knowing all of the client-side inputs driving its behavior.
Our toolchain for verifying a client’s messages explores
multiple candidate execution paths in the client concur-
rently, an innovation that we show is both specifically
useful for cryptographic protocol clients and more gener-
ally useful for client applications of other types, as well.
In addition, our toolchain includes a novel approach to
symbolically executing the client software in multiple
passes that defers expensive functions until their inputs
can be inferred and concretized. We demonstrate client
verification on OpenSSL to show that, e.g., Heartbleed
exploits can be detected without Heartbleed-specific fil-
tering and within seconds of the first malicious packet,
and that verification of legitimate clients can keep pace
with, e.g., Gmail workloads.
1 INTRODUCTION
Tampering with clients in client-server protocols or ap-
plications is an ingredient in numerous abuses. These
abuses can involve exploits on the server directly, or ma-
nipulation of application state for which the client is au-
thoritative. Examples of the former include at least ten
vulnerabilities in the last two years for OpenSSL alone1,
including the high-profile Heartbleed [10] vulnerability,
which enabled a tampered SSL client to extract contents
of server memory. Examples of the latter are “invalid
command” game cheats that permit the client greater
powers or resources in the game [28].
The ideal defense would be to implement formally
verified servers that incorporate all necessary input val-
idation and application-specific checking. However, in
practice, current production servers have codebases too
1CVE-2014-0160, CVE-2014-3512, CVE-2014-3567, CVE-2014-
3513, CVE-2015-0205, CVE-2015-1787, CVE-2015-0293, CVE-
2015-0292, CVE-2015-0208, CVE-2015-0291.
large to retrofit into a formally verified model. More-
over, even simple input validation is difficult to get per-
fect, despite extensive review, as exhibited by widely
deployed security software such as implementations of
Transport Layer Security (TLS). In 2014, critical vulner-
abilities were discovered in all five major implementa-
tions of TLS [18], many of which turned out (after the
fact) to be failures of input validation.
Since it is generally impossible to anticipate all such
abuses, in this paper we explore a holistic approach to
validating client behavior as consistent with a sanctioned
client program. In this approach, a verifier monitors each
client message as it is delivered to the server, to deter-
mine whether the sequence of messages received from
the client so far is consistent with the program the client
is believed to be running and the messages that the server
has sent to the client (Fig. 1). Performing this verification
is challenging primarily because inputs or nondetermin-
istic events at the client may be unknown to the verifier,
and thus, the verifier must solve for whether there ex-
ist inputs that could have driven the client software to
send the messages it did. Furthermore, some of those in-
puts may be protected by cryptographic guarantees (pri-
vate keys in asymmetric cryptography), and maliciously
crafted fields may themselves be hidden by encryption,
as is the case with Heartbleed.
Given:
P : Client Program
M : Network Message
Not Given:
I : Client Inputs
Question:
Could P have 
produced M ?
Legitimate
Potentially
Malicious
YES
NO
✓
X
Figure 1: Abstracted client verification problem.
Our central contribution is to show that legitimate
cryptographic client behavior can in fact be verified, not
against a simplified protocol model but against the client
program. Intuitively, we limit an attacker to only behav-
iors that could be effected by a legitimate client. We
believe this advance to be important: in showing that
messages from a client can be quickly verified as legit-
imate or potentially malicious, we narrow the time be-
tween zero-day exploit and detection/countermeasure to
minutes or even seconds. This is significant, since in the
case of Heartbleed, for example, the bug was introduced
in March 2012 and disclosed in April 2014, a window
of vulnerability of over two years. In fact, with latency-
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tolerant applications (e.g., SMTP), our defense could be
installed inline as a prevention system rather than sim-
ply a detection system. Moreover, our technique accom-
plishes this verification with no vulnerability-specific
configuration and, indeed, would discover client exploit
attempts even prior to a vulnerability’s disclosure. It also
requires no changes to client or server software.2
Following several other works in verification of client
messages when some client-side values are unknown
(see Sec. 2 for a discussion of prior research), the ba-
sic strategy we take is to use symbolic execution [4] to
trace the client execution based on the messages received
so far from the client (and the messages the server has
sent to it). When the verifier, in tracing client execu-
tion, operates on a value that it does not know (a “sym-
bolic” value), it considers all possibilities for that value
(e.g., branching in both directions if a branch statement
involves a symbolic variable) and records constraints
on those symbolic values implied by the execution path
taken. Upon an execution path reaching a message send
point in the client software, the verifier reconciles the
accumulated constraints on that execution path with the
next message received from the client. If the path does
not contradict the message, then the message is con-
firmed as being consistent with some valid client exe-
cution.
Our technical innovations within this direction of re-
search are twofold.
1. Prior research on this form of client verification has
primarily focused on carefully prioritizing candidate
paths through the client in the hopes of finding one
quickly to validate the message trace observed so far.
This prioritization can itself be somewhat expensive
(e.g., involving edit-distance computations on execu-
tion paths) and prone to error, in which case the veri-
fier’s search costs grow dramatically (e.g., [7]). Here
we instead use parallelism to explore candidate paths
concurrently, in lieu of sophisticated path prediction
or to overcome the impact of poor predictions. In
Sec. 4, we describe the architecture of this parallel
client-verification tool and demonstrate its ability to
overcome limitations in path prediction accuracy on
two online games studied in previous research. We
also highlight one aspect of cryptographic protocols
for which efficiently validating client-side behavior
depends on being able to explore multiple execution
fragments in parallel, namely execution fragments re-
flecting plaintexts of different sizes, when the true
plaintext size is hidden by message padding (as in
SSH and draft TLS 1.3). In this case, predicting the
plaintext length is not possible from the ciphertext
2In the case of validating OpenSSL client behavior, we do use a
common diagnostic feature on servers: logging session keys to enable
analysis of network captures.
length, by design, and so exploring different candi-
date lengths in parallel yields substantial savings.
2. When verifying the behavior of a client in a cryp-
tographic protocol such as Transport Layer Security
(TLS), the search for a client execution path to explain
the next client message can be stymied by paths that
contain cryptographic functions for which some in-
puts are unknown (i.e., symbolic). The symbolic exe-
cution of, e.g., the AES block cipher with an unknown
message or a modular exponentiation with an un-
known exponent is simply too costly. Every message-
dependent branch in the AES code or modular ex-
ponentiation routine would need to be explored, and
the resulting formula would be unmanageably com-
plex. In Sec. 5 we therefore describe a multi-pass
algorithm for exploring such paths, whereby user-
specified “prohibitive” functions are bypassed tem-
porarily until their inputs can be deduced through rec-
onciliation with the client message; only then is the
function explored (concretely). In cases where those
inputs can never be inferred—as would be the case for
an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key, for example—the
system outputs the assumption required for the ver-
ification of the client message to be correct, which
can be discharged from a small whitelist of assump-
tions. Aside from these assumptions, our verification
is sound.
We stress that our verification technique, while not
completely turnkey, does not require detailed knowl-
edge of the protocol or application being verified.
For example, the specification of prohibitive functions
and a matching whitelist of permissible assumptions is
straightforward in our examples: the forbidden functions
are simply the AES block cipher, hash functions, and el-
liptic curve group operations; and the whitelist includes
the assumptions that a group element can be produced
by raising the group generator to some power and that
there exists an input that would induce the hash func-
tion to produce a given value (which are both reason-
able). Aside from specifying the forbidden functions and
the whitelist, the other (optional) step is to “stub out”
calls to software that are irrelevant to the analysis (e.g.,
printf). For each of the contributions above, we detail
the effort required by the user to utilize them.
We document the efficacy of our client verification
technique by showing that it can keep pace with client
messages in an interactive Gmail session running over
TLS 1.2 connections. Our verification for each client-
to-server TLS record takes an average of 126ms on a
3.2GHz processor. Taking into account the bursts of
network activity in Gmail traffic, and given that a mes-
sage cannot begin verification until all previous messages
are verified, the verification of any client-to-server mes-
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sage completes a maximum of 14s after the time the
packet was delivered over the network. We also show
that our technique keeps pace with TLS connections that
use message padding, a draft TLS 1.3 [9] feature that in-
troduces costs that our parallel approach is able to over-
come.
2 RELATED WORK
The most closely related work is due to Bethea et al. [1]
and Cochran and Reiter [7]. These works develop al-
gorithms to verify the behavior of (non-cryptographic)
client applications in client-server settings, as we do
here. Bethea et al. adopted a wholly offline strategy, ow-
ing to the expense of their techniques. Cochran and Re-
iter improved the method by which a verifier searches for
a path through the client program that is consistent with
the messages seen by the verifier so far. By leveraging
a training phase and using observed messages to provide
hints as to the client program paths that likely produced
those messages, their technique achieved improved veri-
fication latencies but still fell far short of being able to
keep pace with, e.g., highly interactive games. Their
approach would not work for cryptographic protocols
such as those we consider here, since without substantial
protocol-specific tuning, the cryptographic protections
would obscure information in messages on which their
technique depends for generating these hints. In some
sense, our work in Sec. 5 can be viewed as providing a
method for iteratively stripping away these obfuscating
effects of cryptographic fields, with the bare minimum
of manual configuration or protocol-specific knowledge,
and our work in Sec. 4 then dampens the impact of gen-
erated hints that are ultimately inaccurate.
Several other works have sought to verify the behavior
of clients in client-server protocols. Most permit false
rejections or acceptances since they verify client behav-
ior against an abstract (and so imprecise) model of the
client program (e.g., [12, 14]), versus an actual client
program as we do here. Others seek exact results as we
do, but accomplish this by modifying the client to send
all inputs it processes to the verifier, allowing the verifier
to simply replay the client on those inputs [26]. In our
work, we verify completely unchanged clients and intro-
duce no additional messaging overhead. Proxies for in-
ferring web-form parameter constraints when a web form
is served to a client, to detect parameter-tampering at-
tacks when the form values are returned [24], also pro-
vide exact detection. However, this work addresses only
stateless clients and does so without attention to cryp-
tographically protected traffic. Our work permits stateful
clients and specifically innovates to overcome challenges
associated with cryptographic protocols.
Also related to our goals are numerous works focused
on verifying the correctness of computations outsourced
to an untrusted cloud. Recent works in this area, sur-
veyed by Walfish and Blumberg [27], employ advances
in probabilistically checkable proofs (e.g., [15]) and/or
interactive proofs (e.g., [13]) to permit a verifier to con-
firm (probabilistically) that an untrusted, remote party
performed the outsourced computation correctly, at a
cost to the verifier that is smaller than it performing the
outsourced computation itself. Since we approach the
problem from the opposite viewpoint of a well-resourced
verifier (e.g., running with the server in a large cloud
that the server owner trusts), our techniques do not offer
this last property. However, ours requires no changes to
the party being verified (in our case, the client), whereas
these other works increase the computational cost for the
party being verified (in their case, the cloud) by orders of
magnitude (e.g., see [27, Fig. 5]). Another area of focus
in this domain has been reducing the privacy ramifica-
tions of the additional information sent to the verifier to
enable verification (e.g., [21]). Since our technique does
not require changes to the messaging behavior of the ap-
plication at all, our technique does not suffer from such
drawbacks.
More distantly related to our work is recent progress
on reducing the security of reference implementations of
cryptographic protocols to underlying cryptographic as-
sumptions (e.g., miTLS, a reference implementation of
TLS in F# [2]). Whereas such works prove specified
properties of client and server implementations, our work
instead seeks to prove a property of the messages sent
in an interaction, the property being that these messages
are consistent with a specified client implementation. As
such, our techniques show nothing about the intrinsic se-
curity of the client (or server) implementation itself; nev-
ertheless, they are helpful in detecting a broad range of
common exploit types in client-server protocols, as we
show here. Our techniques also have the feature of being
immediately deployable to existing production protocol
implementations.
3 BACKGROUND AND GOALS
A client-server protocol generates messages msg0,
msg1, . . ., some from the client and some sent by the
server. Our goal is to construct a verifier to validate the
client behavior as represented in the message sequence;
the server is trusted. We assume that the client is single-
threaded and that the message order reflects the order in
which the client sent or received those messages, though
neither of these assumptions is fundamental. Our tech-
nique is not dependent on a particular location for the
verifier, though for the purposes of this paper, we assume
it is near the server, acting as a passive network tap.3
3The verifier can optimistically assume that the order in which it
observes the messages is the order in which the client sent or received
them, and this assumption will often suffice to validate a legitimate
3
Borrowing terminology from prior work [7], the task
of the verifier is to determine whether there exists an exe-
cution prefix of the client that is consistent with the mes-
sages msg0,msg1, . . .. Specifically, an execution pre-
fix Π is a sequence of client instructions that begins at
the client entry point and follows valid branching behav-
ior in the client program. We define Πn to be consis-
tent with msg0, msg1, . . ., msgn, if the network SEND
and RECV instructions4 in Πn number n + 1 and these
network instructions match msg0, msg1, . . ., msgn by
direction—i.e., if msg i is a client-to-server message (re-
spectively, server-to-client message), then the i-th net-
work I/O instruction is a SEND (respectively, RECV)—
and if the branches taken in Πn were possible under the
assumption that msg0,msg1, . . . ,msgn were the mes-
sages sent and received. Consistency of Πn with msg0,
msg1, . . ., msgn requires that the conjunction of all sym-
bolic postconditions at SEND instructions along Πn be
satisfiable, once concretized using contents of messages
msg0, msg1, . . ., msgn sent and received on that path.
The verifier attempts to validate the sequence msg0,
msg1, . . . incrementally, i.e., by verifying the sequence
msg0, msg1, . . ., msgn starting from an execution pre-
fix Πn−1 found to be consistent with msg0, msg1, . . .,
msgn−1, and appending to it an execution fragment that
yields an execution prefix Πn consistent with msg0,
msg1, . . ., msgn. Specifically, an execution fragment is
a nonempty sequence of client instructions (i) beginning
at the client entry point, a SEND, or a RECV in the client
software, (ii) ending at a SEND or RECV, and (iii) having
no intervening SEND or RECV instructions. If there is no
execution fragment that can be appended to Πn−1 to pro-
duce a Πn consistent with msg0, msg1, . . ., msgn, then
the search resumes by backtracking to to find another ex-
ecution prefix Πˆn−1 consistent with msg0, msg1, . . .,
msgn−1, from which the search resumes for an execu-
tion fragment to extend it to yield a Πˆn consistent with
msg0, msg1, . . ., msgn. Only after all such attempts fail
can the client behavior be declared invalid, which may
take substantial time.
Determining if a program can output a given value is
only semidecidable (recursively enumerable); i.e., while
valid client behavior can be declared as such in finite
time, invalid behavior cannot, in general. Thus, an “in-
valid” declaration usually comes by timeout on the veri-
fication process.5 However, our primary concern in this
paper is verifying the behavior of valid clients quickly.
client even if not strictly true, particularly when the client-server proto-
col operates in each direction independently (as in TLS). In other cases,
the verifier could in theory explore other orders when verification with
the observed order fails.
4We abbreviate calls to POSIX send() and recv() system calls
(or their functional equivalents) with the labels SEND and RECV.
5Nevertheless, our tool declares our tested exploit traces as invalid
within several seconds; see Sec. 7.1.
4 PARALLEL CLIENT VERIFICATION
As discussed in the previous section, upon receipt of
message msgn, the verifier attempts to find an execution
fragment with which to extend execution prefix Πn−1
(consistent with msg0, . . ., msgn−1) to create an execu-
tion prefix Πn that is consistent with msg0, . . ., msgn.
Doing so at a pace that keeps up with highly interac-
tive applications remains a challenge (e.g., [7]). We ob-
serve, however, that multiple execution fragments can
be explored concurrently. This permits multiple worker
threads to symbolically execute execution fragments si-
multaneously, while coordinating their activities through
data structures to ensure that they continue to examine
new fragments in priority order. In this section we detail
the design of our tool to do so.
While concurrent exploration of execution fragments
can improve the performance of verification in any
client-server application (as we show in App. A), there
are specific needs for this capability for verifying the
cryptographic protocols of primary interest in this paper.
For example, symbolic execution tools such as the KLEE
tool on which we build [6], while being designed to work
with program variables whose values are unknown (sym-
bolic), nevertheless require the sizes of those variables to
be fixed. Upon observing a message msg i that is en-
crypted, however, it may not be possible to determine
the size of the plaintext if padding is added to the plain-
text before encrypting (as in SSH and TLS 1.3)—and in
some cases, this might be exactly the reason that padding
was introduced (as in the case of TLS 1.3). The cipher-
text length does, however, provide an upper bound on the
plaintext length, and so verification can proceed by con-
sidering each possible plaintext length (up to the cipher-
text length) individually. Doing so sequentially would
result in a many-fold increase in verification cost, how-
ever. Instead, by considering many plaintext lengths in
parallel, the increase in verification cost due to this am-
biguity can be substantially dampened.
4.1 Algorithm overview
We first define the data structures used by the algorithm.
A state σ represents a snapshot of execution in the sym-
bolic virtual machine, including all constraints (path con-
ditions) and memory objects, which includes the con-
tents (symbolic or concrete) of registers, the stack and
the heap. We use σ.cons to represent the constraints ac-
cumulated during the execution to reach σ, and σ.nxt to
represent the next instruction to be executed from σ. The
verifier produces state σn by symbolically executing the
instruction sequence represented by execution prefix Πn.
The algorithm builds and maintains a binary tree con-
sisting of Node objects. Each node nd has a field
nd.path to record a path of instructions in the client; a
field nd.state that holds a symbolic state; children fields
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Figure 2: Example node tree.
nd.child0 and nd.child1 that point to children nodes, and
a field nd.saved that will be described in Sec. 5. The
tree of nodes is rooted with a node nd holding the state
nd.state = σn−1 and nd.path = Πn−1. The two chil-
dren of a node nd in the tree extend nd.path through
the next symbolic branch (i.e., branch instruction with
a symbolic condition). One child node holds a state
with a constraint that maintains that the branch condi-
tion implies false, and the other child node’s state holds
a constraint that indicates that the branch condition is
true. The algorithm succeeds by finding a fragment with
which to extend Πn−1 to yield Πn if, upon extending a
path, it encounters a network I/O instruction that yields a
state with constraints that do not contradict msgn being
the network I/O instruction’s message.
The driving goal of our algorithm is to enable concur-
rent exploration of multiple states in the node tree. To
this end, our parallel verification algorithm uses multi-
ple threads; it uses a single thread to manage the node
tree and several worker threads, each assigned to a sin-
gle node in the node tree at a time. Fig. 2 shows an ex-
ample assignment of four workers to multiple nodes in
a node tree. In our design and experiments, the num-
ber of worker threads NumWorkers is a fixed parameter
provided to the verifier. Because the verification task is
largely CPU-bound, in our experience it is not beneficial
to use more worker threads than the number of logical
CPU cores, and in some cases, fewer worker threads than
cores are necessary.
4.2 Detailed algorithm description
We will express our algorithm using standard multi-
threading primitives. The keyword spawn indicates the
creation of a child thread that will execute a named pro-
cedure until completion, at which point the child thread
will terminate. The keyword sync denotes that the parent
procedure will not proceed to the next statement until all
spawned child threads have finished execution. In addi-
tion, statements involving accesses to shared data struc-
tures will be performed atomically (i.e., in a critical sec-
tion), though for readability we do not include explicit
designation of the critical section boundaries in our pseu-
docode. Also for readability, our pseudocode does not
represent backtracking.
100 procedure ParallelVerify(Πn−1, σn−1, msgn)
101 Root← makeNode(Πn−1, σn−1, true)
102 QR ← makeNodeQueue() . Nodes ready to execute
103 QA ← makeNodeQueue() . Nodes added by workers
104 Done← false . Instructs all threads to halt
105 Rslt← makeNode(⊥,⊥,⊥) . Filled in on success
106 spawn NodeScheduler(Root, QR, QA, Done)
107 for 1 to NumWorkers do
108 spawn VfyMsg(msgn, Root, QR, QA, Done, Rslt)
109 sync . Wait for all child threads
110 return Rslt . Return result
Figure 3: Main procedure for parallel client verification.
The algorithm for verifying a client-to-server message
using thread-level parallelism is shown in Fig. 3. This
algorithm, denoted ParallelVerify, takes as input the ex-
ecution prefix Πn−1 consistent with msg0, . . . ,msgn−1;
the symbolic state σn−1 resulting from execution of
Πn−1 from the client entry point on message trace
msg0, . . . ,msgn−1; and the next message msgn. Its out-
put is Rslt, which holds the prefix Πn and corresponding
state σn in Rslt.path and Rslt.state, respectively, if a pre-
fix consistent with msg0, . . . ,msgn is found. If the pro-
cedure returns with Rslt.path = Rslt.state = ⊥, then
this indicates that there is no execution prefix that can
extend Πn−1 to make Πn that is consistent with msg0,
. . ., msgn. This will induce backtracking to search for
another Πˆn−1 that is consistent with msg0, . . ., msgn−1,
which the verifier will then try to extend to find a Πˆn
consistent with msg0, . . ., msgn.
The algorithm operates in a parent thread that spawns
NumWorkers + 1 child threads; this includes one thread
to manage scheduling of nodes for execution via the pro-
cedure NodeScheduler (not shown) and NumWorkers
worker threads to explore candidate execution fragments
via the procedure VfyMsg (Fig. 4).
NodeScheduler manages the selection of node states
to execute next and maintains the flow of nodes between
worker threads. It receives as input two queues of nodes,
a “ready” queue QR and an “added” queue QA. These
queues are shared between the worker threads and the
NodeScheduler thread. Worker threads pull nodes from
QR and push new nodes onto QA. As there is only one
scheduler thread and one or more worker threads produc-
ing and consuming nodes from the queues QR and QA,
QR is a single-producer-multi-consumer priority queue
and QA is a multi-producer-single-consumer queue. The
goal of NodeScheduler is to keep QA empty and QR
full. Nodes are in one of four possible states, either
actively being explored inside VfyMsg, stored in QR,
stored in QA, or being prioritized by NodeScheduler.
A node at the front of QR is the highest priority node
not currently being explored. The nodes in QA are child
nodes that have been created by VfyMsg threads that
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need to be prioritized by NodeScheduler and inserted
into QR. NodeScheduler continues executing until the
boolean Done is set to true by some VfyMsg thread.
Shown in Fig. 4, the procedure VfyMsg does the main
work of client verification: stepping execution forward
in the state σ of each node. In this figure, lines shaded
gray will be explained in Sec. 5 and can be ignored
for now (i.e., read Fig. 4 as if these lines simply do
not exist). Like NodeScheduler, the procedure VfyMsg
runs inside of a while loop until the value of Done is
no longer equal to false (201). Recall that the parent
procedure ParallelVerify spawns multiple instances of
VfyMsg. Whenever there is a node on the queue QR,
the condition on line 202 will be true and the procedure
calls dequeue atomically. Note that even if |QR| = 1,
multiple instances of VfyMsg may call dequeue in 203,
but only one will return a node; the rest will retrieve un-
defined (⊥) from dequeue.
If nd is not undefined (204), the algorithm proceeds
to execute the state nd.state and extend the associated
path nd.path up to either the next network instruction
(SEND or RECV) or the next symbolic branch (a branch
instruction that is conditioned on a symbolic variable).
The first case, stepping execution on a non-network
/ non-symbolic-branch instruction σ.nxt (here denoted
isNormal(σ.nxt)), executes in a while loop on lines 206–
208. The current instruction is appended to the path and
the procedure execStep is called, which symbolically ex-
ecutes the next instruction in state σ. These lines are
where the majority of the computation work is done by
the verifier. The ability to concurrently step execution
on multiple states is where the largest performance ben-
efits of parallelization are achieved. Note that calls to
execStep may invoke branch instructions, but these are
non-symbolic branches.
In the second case, if the next instruction is SEND or
RECV and if the constraints σ.cons accumulated so far
with the symbolic state σ do not contradict the possibil-
ity that the network I/O message σ.nxt.msg in the next
instruction σ.nxt is msgn (i.e., (σ.cons ∧ σ.nxt.msg =
msgn) 6⇒ false, line 210), then the algorithm has suc-
cessfully reached an execution prefix Πn consistent with
msg0, . . ., msgn. The algorithm sets the termination
value (Done = true) and sets the return values of the
parent function on lines 212–213: Rslt.path is set to the
newly found execution prefix Πn and Rslt.state is set to
the state that results from executing it, conditioned on
the last message being msgn (denoted [execStep(σ) |
σ.nxt.msg 7→ msgn]). All other threads of execution
now exit because Done = true and the parent procedure
ParallelVerify will return Rslt.
In the final case, (isSymbolicBranch(σ.nxt)), the al-
gorithm is at a symbolic branch. Thus, the branch con-
dition contains symbolic variables and cannot be evalu-
200 procedure VfyMsg(msgn, Root, QR, QA, Done, Rslt)
201 while ¬Done do
202 if |QR| > 0 then
203 nd← dequeue(QR)
204 if nd 6= ⊥ then
205 pi ← nd.path ; σ ← nd.state
206 while isNormal(σ.nxt) do
207 pi ← pi ‖ 〈σ.nxt〉
208 σ ← execStep(σ)
209 if isNetInstr(σ.nxt) then
210 if (σ.cons ∧ σ.nxt.msg = msgn) 6⇒ false then
211 if (σ.cons ∧ σ.nxt.msg= msgn) ≡ nd.saved
then
212 Rslt.path← pi ‖ 〈σ.nxt〉
213 Rslt.state←
[execStep(σ) | σ.nxt.msg 7→ msgn]
214 Done← true . Success!
215 else
216 nd← clone(Root)
217 nd.saved← σ.cons ∧ σ.nxt.msg = msgn
218 enqueue(QA, nd)
219 else if isProhibitive(σ.nxt) then
220 nd.path← pi ‖ 〈σ.nxt〉
221 nd.state← execStepProhibitive(σ, nd.saved)
222 enqueue(QA, nd)
223 else if isSymbolicBranch(σ.nxt) then
224 pi ← pi ‖ 〈σ.nxt〉
225 σ′ ← clone(σ)
226 σ′ ← [execStep(σ′) | σ′.nxt.cond 7→ false]
227 if σ′.cons 6⇒ false then
228 nd.child0 ← makeNode(pi, σ′, nd.saved)
229 enqueue(QA, nd.child0)
230 σ ← [execStep(σ) | σ.nxt.cond 7→ true]
231 if σ.cons 6⇒ false then
232 nd.child1 ← makeNode(pi, σ, nd.saved)
233 enqueue(QA, nd.child1)
Figure 4: VfyMsg procedure. Shaded lines will be explained in Sec. 5.
ated as true or false in isolation. Using symbolic exe-
cution, the algorithm evaluates both the true branch and
the false branch by executing σ.nxt conditioned on the
condition evaluating to false (denoted [execStep(σ′) |
σ′.nxt.cond 7→ false] in line 226) and conditioned on the
branch condition evaluating to true (230). In each case,
the constraints of the resulting state are checked for con-
sistency (227, 231), for example, using an SMT solver.
If either state is consistent, it is atomically placed onto
QA (229, 233).
4.3 Algorithm summary
Let us return to Fig. 2 from earlier, which depicts a node
tree rooted at σn−1 during the verification of msgn. The
node colored white with a solid outline represents the
root node with state σn−1. The nodes colored white with
dashed outlines, are the dead nodes and represent inter-
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mediate states that no longer exist. A node is dead when
it does not reach a success condition or exits the main
if block of VfyMsg (starting on line 204) without gener-
ating any child nodes. Nodes colored black are the ac-
tive nodes and are currently being explored by worker
threads. Nodes colored dark gray are being prioritized
by NodeScheduler and are still live. If there are worker
threads that are ready to process a node, the highest pri-
ority live nodes are in QR. Nodes colored light gray are
the infant nodes and are in QA. We can see that worker
W4 recently hit a symbolic branch condition and created
two infant nodes which were added to QA. The other
workers are likely executing lines 206–208.
While we are mainly concerned with cryptographic
protocols, in App. A we show that our parallel algorithm
can be highly effective in improving the speed of verify-
ing clients in other distributed applications.
5 MULTIPASS CLIENT VERIFICATION
As shown in App. A, concurrent exploration of execution
fragments can be highly beneficial to the speed of val-
idating legitimate client behavior in non-cryptographic
protocols. For verifying a cryptographic client, con-
current exploration of execution fragments can be sim-
ilarly beneficial, as we will show in Sec. 7.3. Nev-
ertheless, there remain challenges to verifying crypto-
graphic clients that no reasonable amount of paralleliza-
tion can overcome, since doing so would be tantamount
to breaking some of the underlying cryptographic primi-
tives themselves. In this section, we introduce a strategy
for client verification that can overcome these hurdles for
practical protocols such as TLS.
The most obvious challenge is encrypted messages. To
make sense of these messages, the verifier will need to be
given the symmetric session key under which they are en-
crypted. Fortunately, existing implementations of, e.g.,
OpenSSL servers, enable logging session keys to support
analysis of network captures, and so we rely on such fa-
cilities to provide the session key to the verifier. Given
this, it is theoretically straightforward to reverse the en-
cryption on a client-to-server message mid-session—just
as the server can—but that capability does surprisingly
little to itself aid the verification of the client’s behav-
ior. Indeed, state-of-the-art servers routinely fail to de-
tect problems with the message sequence received from a
client, as demonstrated by numerous such CVEs over the
past two years in all major TLS implementations [18].
We therefore continue with our strategy of incremen-
tally building an execution prefix Π in the client software
as each message is received by the verifier to validate
the client’s behavior. The verifier injects the logged ses-
sion key into the execution prefix at the point where the
key would first be generated by the client. Still, how-
ever, the number of execution fragments that need to be
explored in cryptographic protocol client implementa-
tions is far too large to overcome by concurrent explo-
ration alone, when other inputs to cryptographic algo-
rithms can be symbolic. Some of these (e.g., a message
plaintext, once decrypted) could be injected by the ver-
ifier like the session key is, but in our experience, con-
figuring where to inject what values would require sub-
stantially greater client-implementation-specific knowl-
edge and bookkeeping than injecting just the session key
does. This is in part due to the many layers in which
cryptographic mechanisms are applied in modern proto-
cols; e.g., in the TLS handshake, multiple messages are
hashed to form the plaintext of another message, which is
subsequently encrypted and authenticated. Even worse,
other values, such as a client’s ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
key, will never become available to a verifier (or server)
and so cannot be injected into an execution prefix Π.
These observations motivate a design whereby the ver-
ifier is permitted to skip specified functions that would
simply be too expensive to execute with symbolic in-
puts. Specifying such prohibitive functions need not re-
quire substantial client-implementation-specific or even
protocol-specific knowledge; in our experience with
TLS, for example, it suffices to specify basic crypto-
graphic primitives such as modular exponentiation, block
ciphers, and hash functions as prohibitive. Once speci-
fied as prohibitive, the function is skipped by the verifier
if any of its inputs are symbolic, producing a symbolic
result instead. Once reconciled with the message se-
quence msg0, . . ., msgn under consideration, however,
the verifier can solve for some values that it was previ-
ously forced to keep symbolic, after which it can go back
and verify function computations (concretely) it had pre-
viously skipped. Once additional passes yield no new
information, the verifier outputs any unverified function
computations (e.g., ones based on the client’s ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman key) as assumptions on which the verifi-
cation rests. Only if one of these assumptions is not true
will our verifier erroneously accept this message trace.
As we will see, however, these remaining assumptions
for a protocol like TLS are minimal.
5.1 User configuration
As mentioned previously, our algorithm requires the
specification of prohibitive functions. A prohibitive
function is required to have no side effects other than al-
tering its own parameters (or parameter buffers if passed
by reference) and producing a return value; given the
same inputs, it must produce the same results; and it must
be possible to compute the sizes of all output buffers as
a function of the sizes of the input buffers. A function
should be specified as prohibitive if executing it on sym-
bolic inputs induces a large number of symbolic states,
due to branching that depends on input values. For ex-
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ample, a physics engine might contain signal processing
functions that should be marked prohibitive.
In our case studies, the prohibitive functions are cryp-
tographic functions such as the AES block cipher or
SHA-256. We stress, however, that the user need not
know how these primitives are composed into a proto-
col. We illustrate this in App. B, where we show the user
configuration needed for verifying the OpenSSL client,
including the specification of the prohibitive functions.
Specifying prohibitive functions generalizes the nor-
mal procedure used by symbolic execution to inject sym-
bolic inputs into the program. The user normally desig-
nates “user input” functions (such as getchar) as sym-
bolic, so that each one is essentially replaced with a func-
tion that always returns a symbolic, unconstrained value
of the appropriate size. The random number generators,
client-side inputs (i.e., stdin), and functions that re-
turn the current time are typically so designated. The
user configuration for prohibitive functions simply ex-
tends this mechanism so that some of these functions do
not always return symbolic outputs, but return concrete
outputs when their inputs are fully concrete.
5.2 Algorithm description
The multipass verification algorithm involves changes to
the VfyMsg procedure in Fig. 4, specifically the inser-
tion of the shaded lines. Whenever σ.nxt is a call to a
prohibitive function, it is treated separately (lines 219–
222), using the execStepProhibitive function (221). (To
accomplish this, isNormal in line 206 now returns false
not only for any network instruction or symbolic branch,
but also for any call to a prohibitive function.) If
execStepProhibitive receives a call σ.nxt to a prohibitive
function with any symbolic input buffers, it replaces the
call with an operation producing fully symbolic out-
put buffers of the appropriate size. However, if the
constraints saved in nd.saved allow the concrete input
buffer values to be inferred, then execStepProhibitive in-
stead performs the call σ.nxt on the now-concrete input
buffers.
Prior to the execution path reaching a network instruc-
tion, when a call σ.nxt to a prohibitive function is en-
countered, nd.saved is simply true as initialized (see the
third argument to makeNode in line 101 of Fig. 3, as well
as in 228 and 232), permitting no additional inferences
about the values of input buffers to σ.nxt. After a net-
work instruction is reached and msgn is reconciled with
the constraints σ.cons accumulated along the path so far
(210), the path constraints σ.cons and the new constraint
σ.nxt.msg = msgn are saved in nd.saved (217). The ex-
ecution path is then replayed from the root of the binary
tree (i.e., beginning from Πn−1, see 216). This process
repeats until an execution occurs in which nothing new is
learned (i.e., (σ.cons∧σ.nxt.msg = msgn) ≡ nd.saved,
void Client(int x, int y, int iv) {
int p = x*y;
if (x % 9 == 0) {
if (y & 1 == 1) {
int s = AES(iv);
int c = p ˆ s;
SEND(iv, c);
}
}
}
(a) Example client code
x % 9 == 0
FALSE TRUE
y & 1 == 1
AES(iv)
SEND(iv, c)
FALSE TRUE
Initial State:
x = ?, y = ?, iv = ?
Learned Constraints:
p = x * y
x % 9 = 0
y & 1 = 1
c = p ^ s
iv = 0x1234
c = 0x9DAC
Message to Verify:
𝑚𝑠𝑔0 = 0x12349DAC
𝜎. cons
nd.saved
(b) Pass one
x % 9 == 0
TRUE
y & 1 == 1
SEND(iv, c)
TRUE
AES(iv)
Initial State:
x = ?, y = ?
iv = 0x1234, c = 0x9DAC
Learned Constraints:
p = x * y
x % 9 = 0
y & 1 = 1
c = p ^ s
iv = 0x1234
c = 0x9DAC
s = 0x2343
p = 0xBEEF
Message to Verify:
𝑚𝑠𝑔0 = 0x12349DAC
𝜎. cons
≡
nd.saved
(c) Pass two
Figure 5: Example of multipass verification on a simple client.
in 211), at which point VfyMsg returns as before.
5.3 Detailed walk-through
In Sec. 5.2, we concisely summarized the multipass al-
gorithm as defined by the shaded lines in Fig. 4. We now
provide a detailed walk-through of the algorithm on a
segment of C code that includes both an encryption op-
eration and a network operation (Fig. 5a), starting from
entry point and following the verifier to termination.
This client multiplies two of its inputs x and y, en-
crypts it using a third input iv as an initialization vec-
tor, and sends both iv and the encrypted value to the
server. Our tool begins with a node initialized to the
client entry point and attempts to verify (by spawning
one or more threads that execute VfyMsg) that there ex-
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ist inputs x, y, and iv that would produce the output
message msg0 = 0x12349DAC that was observed over
the network.
The instance of VfyMsg that first reaches the SEND
has, by that time, accumulated constraints σ.cons as
specified in Fig. 5b. Note, however, that it has no con-
straints relating s (the output of AES(iv)) and iv,
since AES was designated as prohibitive and skipped
(since iv is symbolic). After reconciling these con-
straints with the message msg0 = 0x12349DAC, the
verifier records nd.saved.
The verifier then re-executes from Root (Fig. 5c),
although since it now knows iv = 0x1234, this
time it does not skip AES. It thus computes a
concrete output s = 0x2343 and the constraint
0x9DAC = p ˆ 0x2343, i.e., p = 0xBEEF. After
this second pass, the constraints in nd.saved are still sat-
isfiable (e.g., x = 0x9, y = 0x1537). However, the
third pass (not shown) reveals no more information, so
VfyMsg returns the corresponding execution prefix and
state at the end of the third pass.
5.4 TLS example
We illustrate the behavior of the multipass algorithm on
TLS. Fig. 6 shows an abstracted subset of a TLS client
implementation of AES-GCM, running on a single block
of plaintext input. For clarity, the example omits details
such as the implicit nonce, the server ECDH parameters,
the generation of the four symmetric keys, and subsumes
the tag computation into the GHASH function. But in all
features shown, this walkthrough closely exemplifies the
multi-pass verification of a real-world TLS client.
In Fig. 6, the outputs observed by the verifier are the
client Diffie-Hellman parameter A, the initialization vec-
tor iv, the ciphertext c, and the AES-GCM tag t. The
unobserved inputs are the Diffie-Hellman private expo-
nent a, the initialization vector iv, and the plaintext p.
We do assume access to the AES symmetric key k. Since
the client verification is being performed on the server
end of the connection, we can use server state, including
the symmetric key. The verifier decides whether the ob-
served outputs are legal, given knowledge of the program
but not its inputs.
In the first pass of symbolic execution (Fig. 6a), even
with knowledge of the AES symmetric key k, all pro-
hibitive functions (ECDH, AES, GHASH) have at least
one symbolic input. So, execStepProhibitive skips them
and produces unconstrained symbolic output for each.
After the first execution pass (Fig. 6b), the verifier en-
counters the observed client outputs. Reconciling them
with the accumulated constraints σ.cons yields concrete
values for A, t, c, and iv, but not the other variables.
The verifier then begins the second pass of symbolic
execution (Fig. 6c). At this point, AES and GHASH both
have concrete inputs, and therefore can be executed con-
cretely. Note that the concrete execution of AES yields
a concrete value for s, which was not previously known.
At the end of the second execution pass (Fig. 6d), the ver-
ifier implicitly uses the new knowledge of s to check that
there exists a p, the unobserved plaintext value, that sat-
isfies the constraints imposed by observed output. Fur-
ther passes beyond this point yield no additional infor-
mation, as no further symbolic inputs to prohibitive func-
tions can be concretized.
Note that the value of a, the client Diffie-Hellman
private exponent, is never computed. The verifier thus
yields as output an additional assumption that there exists
an a such that ECDH(a) yields values A and k. As such,
we do not detect invalid curve attacks [16], for example;
we discuss practical mitigations for this in Sec. 8.2.
Perhaps remarkably, no decryption mechanism is ex-
plicitly provided to the verifier. The multipass mecha-
nism automatically recovers the plaintext for stream ci-
phers and counter-mode block ciphers. For other modes
such as CBC, the user could provide inverse functions
via an extension described in App. D.
6 IMPLEMENTATION
We have designed and implemented a prototype of our
client verification technique. Our implementation is built
upon a modified version of KLEE [6] and employs opti-
mizations used in previous work [7] as well as several
new performance improvements. At a high level, KLEE
serves as an interpreter of LLVM assembly instructions.
When an instruction has symbolic operands, the oper-
ation is stored as a symbolic expression; otherwise the
operation is interpreted concretely. Note that even in-
terpreting instructions concretely induces a significant
performance penalty compared to native execution. We
reduce this cost by leveraging the information provided
in the user configuration of prohibitive functions to mix
in native execution of calls to prohibitive functions with
concrete inputs. The only additional requirement for this
optimization is to provide the verifier with a native shared
object that exports implementations of the prohibitive
functions.
Symbolic execution of the client requires interaction
with the environment through library and system calls.
Our implementation inherits and extends several mecha-
nisms from KLEE for interacting with the environment.
We use a combination of the POSIX model provided
by KLEE, and an expanded POSIX environment model
from another system, Cloud9 [5]. We also make two
key extensions to this model to support network instruc-
tions and prohibitive functions. First, during symbolic
execution of the client, each SEND or RECV is is inter-
cepted and the next message in the trace under verifica-
tion for a given symbolic state is processed as described
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Figure 6: Multipass algorithm on a TLS client implementing an abstracted subset of AES-GCM. Rectangular blocks are prohibitive functions;
circles are variables. Shaded nodes are concrete values or functions executed with concrete inputs. Unshaded nodes are symbolic values or skipped
functions. In Fig. 6b and Fig. 6d, some values become concrete when σ.cons is reconciled with σ.nxt.msg = msgn in line 210.
in Sec. 4. POSIX network calls are thus modeled to
be consistent with the message trace we are verifying.
Prohibitive functions are supported through an extension
to the KLEE runtime model. The steps a user takes to
add a prohibitive function to a given client program are
straightforward. First, the user adds the function signa-
ture to a specified file in the KLEE runtime model using
an API provided by the verifier. Next, the user defines
the input parameters and their size, as well as the output
parameters and size (as a function of the input size). The
model is compiled and linked with the client program
to prepare for verification. When a prohibitive function
is reached during verification, the verifier uses the user-
provided annotations to identify if any input memory is
symbolic and, if so, the function is “skipped” and the
outputs are initialized and marked as symbolic. If all in-
puts are concrete, then the underlying implementation is
executed.
The parallel client verification algorithm (Sec. 4) re-
quires a mechanism to concurrently execute symbolic
states. We extended KLEE to support multi-threaded op-
eration. Our changes did not significantly alter the over-
all architecture of KLEE, but several submodules required
modification to support concurrent execution, including
symbolic state “searchers”, symbolic memory manage-
ment, and constraint caching and solving.
To our knowledge, no current symbolic execution
engines support parallel execution in a single process
via multiple threads. While other efforts have demon-
strated the feasibility and performance benefits of paral-
lelized symbolic execution engines ([5, 23, 25]), these
approaches differ from ours by dividing the symbolic ex-
ecution work across multiple processes or hosts instead
of across multiple threads. A multi-threaded symbolic
execution engine can leverage opportunities to identify
duplicate states, utilize state merging, and utilize shared
constraint-solving caches. Furthermore, our architecture
does not incur costs due to the latency of communication
between multiple hosts; our application of symbolic ex-
ecution to client verification requires high speed context
switching between states. Additionally our state selec-
tion can achieve efficiencies with global knowledge of
the progress of each execution path. Finally, our veri-
fier is designed to solve SMT queries concurrently with
multiple instantiations of an SMT solver, in our case
STP [11].
7 EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate our implementation of the al-
gorithms in Secs. 4–5. First, we run a single-worker ver-
ifier against two attacks on OpenSSL that represent dif-
ferent classes of client misbehavior. Second, we load test
a single-worker verifier on a typical TLS 1.2 payload,
i.e., the traffic generated by a Gmail session. Third, we
increase the verification complexity to demonstrate scal-
ability to more complex protocols with larger client state
spaces, which we overcome using multiple workers. We
do this by simulating verification of a TLS 1.3 draft [9]
feature that permits arbitrary random padding in every
packet. The OpenSSL configuration options we used are
listed in App. B. All experiments were run on a system
with 256GB of RAM and 3.2GHz processor cores.
Our primary measure of performance is verification
lag. To define lag, let the verification cost of a message
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msgn, denoted cost(n), be the wall-clock time that the
verifier spends to conclude if msgn is valid, beginning
from the execution prefix Πn−1 produced from the suc-
cessful verification of msg0, . . . ,msgn−1. Since the ver-
ifier is compute-bound, cost(n) is roughly the CPU time
that it spends to produce Πn from Πn−1.6 The comple-
tion time for msgn is then defined inductively as follows:
comp(0) = cost(0)
comp(n) = max{arr(n), comp(n− 1)}+ cost(n)
where arr(n) is the wall-clock time when msgn ar-
rived at the verifier. Since the verification of msgn can-
not begin until after both (i) it is received at the ver-
ifier (at time arr(n)) and (ii) the previous messages
msg0, . . . ,msgn−1 have completed verification (at time
comp(n− 1)), comp(n) is calculated as the cost cost(n)
incurred after both (i) and (ii) are met. Finally, the lag of
msgn is lag(n) = comp(n) − arr(n), which is our pri-
mary measure of performance.
7.1 Heartbleed and CVE-2015-0205 detection
We first evaluate our client verifier against two attacks on
OpenSSL, which are meant to be illustrative of different
classes of vulnerabilities that we can verify: those related
to tampering with the client software to produce mes-
sages that a client could not have produced (CVE-2014-
0160 Heartbleed) and a message sequence that, while
correctly formatted, is impossible given a valid client
state machine (CVE-2015-0205).
An OpenSSL 1.0.1f s server was instantiated with
standard settings, and an OpenSSL s clientwas mod-
ified so that it would establish a TLS connection and send
a single Heartbleed exploit packet. This packet had a
modified length field, and when received by an OpenSSL
1.0.1f s server, caused the server to disclose sensitive
information from memory.
When client verification was applied to a normal client
(which sends a normal Heartbeat packet), the verifica-
tion lag for the (last message of the) connection was 1.7s.
When it was applied to a client that sends a Heartbleed
exploit, the validation process was unable to find an ex-
planation for the contents of the packet and rejected the
packet after exhausting all search paths, with a lag for the
Heartbleed packet of 6.9s.
Unlike Heartbleed, CVE-2015-0205 contains only
correctly formatted messages. In the certificate ex-
change, a good client will send a DH certificate (used
to generate a pre-master secret), followed by a 0-length
ClientKeyExchange message. A malicious client will
send a certificate, followed by a ClientKeyExchange
6In case of backtracking—i.e., if at any point an alternate prefix
Πˆn−1 must be produced—then the time needed to advance Πˆn−1 to
an Πˆn that is consistent with all of msg0, . . . ,msgn is also accumu-
lated into cost(n).
message containing a DH parameter. The server will au-
thenticate the certificate, but prefer the second message’s
DH parameter, allowing a malicious client to imper-
sonate anyone whose public certificate it has obtained.
We introduced this vulnerability to an OpenSSL 1.0.1d
s server which was instantiated with standard set-
tings, and an OpenSSL s client was modified to send
a ClientKeyExchange containing a DH parameter. The
server authenticated the certificate but preferred the sec-
ond DH parameter.
The verification lag for the good connection was 1.3s,
and the verifier rejected an attempted attack after a lag of
2.4s. This exploit illustrates the power of our technique:
we not only verify whether each message is possible in
isolation, but also in the context of all previous messages.
Since the tool verifies valid client behavior, no attack-
specific configuration was required. We do not require
any foreknowledge of the exploit and anticipate correct
detection of other exploits requiring client tampering.
7.2 Performance evaluation: Typical TLS load
The Gmail performance test was designed to measure the
lag that would result from running a single-worker ver-
ifier against typical real-world TLS traffic. The data set
was a tcpdump capture of a three-minute Gmail session
conducted in Firefox, and consisted of 21 concurrent,
independent TLS sessions, totaling 3.8MB of network
data. This Gmail session was performed in the context
of one of the authors’ email accounts and included both
receiving emails and sending emails with attachments.
The verification objective of this test was to verify
the TLS layer of a network connection, but not the ap-
plication layer above it, such as the browser logic and
Gmail web application. To simulate the client-server
configuration without access to Gmail servers and pri-
vate keys, we used the packet sizes and timings from the
Gmail tcpdump to generate 21 equivalent sessions us-
ing OpenSSL s client and s server, such that the
amount of traffic sent in each direction at any point in
time matches identically with that of the original Gmail
capture. Since s client implements a few diagnos-
tic features in addition to TLS (but no application layer),
verifying s client against these 21 sessions provides
a conservative evaluation of the time required to verify
the pure TLS layer.
Fig. 7 shows the bandwidth characteristics of these 21
TLS connections. As can be seen, one of the 21 TLS
sessions was responsible for the vast majority of the data
transferred, and almost all of the data it carried was car-
ried from the server to the client (Fig. 7b); presumably
this was a bulk-transfer connection that was involved
in prefetching, attachment uploading, or other latency-
insensitive tasks. The other 20 TLS sessions were uti-
lized comparatively lightly and presumably involved in
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Figure 7: Cumulative data transferred for a Gmail session consisting
of 21 TLS connections. Fig. 7a shows the volumes transferred in the
client-to-server direction, with one line per TLS session. Fig. 7b shows
the volumes transferred in the server-to-client direction.
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Figure 8: Verification lags in seconds for the messages in the Gmail
data set. Box plot at horizontal-axis value t includes {lag(i) : t ≤
arr(i) < t+30s}. Fig. 8a shows the verification lags for all messages
in all 21 TLS sessions. Fig. 8b shows the verification lags for only the
messages in the high-volume session.
more latency-sensitive activities.
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Figure 9: Message size (kilobytes)
versus verification cost (seconds).
Client-to-server messages (•) and
server-to-client handshake messages
(•) are shown.
Fig. 8 shows the
distribution of veri-
fication lag of mes-
sages, grouped by
the 30-second inter-
val in which they ar-
rived at the verifier.
Fig. 8a show all of
the messages’ verifi-
cation lag, whereas
Fig. 8b isolates the
lag for the one high-
volume flow shown
in Fig. 7. It is evi-
dent from these fig-
ures that majority of the verification lag happens early
on, initially up to ∼ 30s in the worst case. This lag co-
incides with an initial burst of traffic related to requests
while loading the Gmail application. Another burst oc-
curs later, roughly 160s into the trace, when an attach-
ment was uploaded by the client. Still, even for the high-
volume session (Fig. 8b), the lag is reduced to near-zero
in the middle of the session and by the end of the session.
The same holds true for the other 20 sessions, meaning
that verification for all sessions (in parallel) can easily
complete within approximately the wall-clock interval
for which the sessions are active.
Fig. 9 shows verification cost as a function of mes-
sage size for all 21 TLS sessions. Note that client-to-
server messages tend to be costlier to verify, despite be-
ing smaller, because the verifier’s execution of the client
software when processing server-to-client messages is
almost entirely concrete. In contrast, the execution of the
client in preparation of sending a client-to-server mes-
sage tends to involve more symbolic branching. But
what is most noteworthy about this plot is the linearity
of the relationship between message size and verifica-
tion cost, particularly for client-to-server messages. This
is remarkable, given that the general problem of client
verification is undecidable. In fact, it provides a simple,
application-independent way to estimate the costs of ver-
ification for TLS sessions carrying payloads other than
Gmail. Furthermore, assuming similar upper bounds on
the sizes of messages in each direction, this predictabil-
ity enables us to set a sharp timeout at which point the
verifier declares the client “invalid.” Based on Fig. 9,
setting the timeout at a mere 2s (verification cost) would
enable the verifier to quickly detect misbehaving clients
at a vanishingly small false alarm rate.
TLS-Specific Optimizations. While our goal so far in
this paper has been to provide for client behavior veri-
fication with a minimum of protocol-specific tuning, a
practical deployment should leverage properties of the
protocol for performance. One important property of
TLS (and other TCP-based protocols such as SSH) is that
its client-to-server and server-to-client message streams
operate independently. That is, with the exception of the
initial session handshake and ending session teardown,
the verifiability of client-to-server messages should be
unaffected by which, if any, server-to-client messages the
client has received. This gives the verifier the freedom
to simply ignore server-to-client application data mes-
sages. By doing so, the verification costs for server-to-
client messages, which effectively reduce to zero, do not
contribute to a growing lag. The effect of this optimiza-
tion on lag is shown in Fig. 10, in particular reducing the
worst-case lag to around 14s. In all subsequent results,
we have ignored server-to-client messages unless other-
wise noted.
7.3 Stress testing: Added protocol complexity
The Gmail performance evaluation showed that verifi-
cation of a typical TLS 1.2 session can be done effi-
ciently and reliably, an advance made possible by apply-
ing a multipass methodology to cryptographic functions.
In essence, once the state explosion from cryptographic
functions is mitigated, the client state space becomes
small enough that the verification time is primarily de-
termined the straight-line execution speed of the KLEE
symbolic interpreter. However, not all clients are guar-
anteed to be this simple. One good example is the draft
TLS 1.3 standard [9]. In order to hide the length of the
12
ll
ll
ll
l
l l
ll
l
l
0
3
6
9
12
15
0 30 60 90 12
0
15
0
18
0
Arrival Time (s)
Ve
rif
ica
tio
n 
La
g 
(s)
(a) All 21 TLS sessions
l l
0
3
6
9
12
15
0 30 60 90 12
0
15
0
18
0
Arrival Time (s)
Ve
rif
ica
tio
n 
La
g 
(s)
(b) High-volume session
Figure 10: Verification lags in seconds for the messages in the Gmail
data set, dropping server-to-client application data messages. Box plot
at horizontal-axis value t includes {lag(i) : t ≤ arr(i) < t + 30s}.
Fig. 8a shows the verification lags for all messages in all 21 TLS ses-
sions. Fig. 8b shows the verification lags for only the messages in the
high-volume session.
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Figure 11: Verification lags in seconds for the messages in the Gmail
data set when up to 128 bytes of encrypted random padding are applied,
over all 21 TLS sessions. A box plot at horizontal-axis value t includes
{lag(i) : t ≤ arr(i) < t + 30s}. Fig. 11a shows the lag for a one-
worker verifier when padding is applied. Fig. 11b shows the lag for a
16-worker verifier when padding is applied.
plaintext from an observer, implementations of TLS 1.3
are permitted (but not required) to pad an encrypted TLS
record by an arbitrary size, up to maximum TLS record
size. This random encrypted padding hides the size of
the plaintext from any observer, whether an attacker or
a verifier. In other words, given a TLS 1.3 record, the
length of the input (e.g., from stdin) that was used to
generate the TLS record could range anywhere from 0 to
the record length minus header. Other less extreme ex-
amples of padding include CBC mode ciphers, and the
SSH protocol, in which a small amount of padding pro-
tects the length of the password as well as channel traffic.
We thus extended our evaluation to stress test our ver-
ifier beyond typical current practice. We simulated the
TLS 1.3 padding feature by modifying a TLS 1.2 client
(henceforth designated as “TLS 1.2+”), so that each TLS
record includes a random amount of padding up to 128
bytes7, applied before encryption. We then measured
the performance of our verifier, ignoring server-to-client
messages (except during session setup and teardown) as
before.
7While 128 bytes of padding may seem extreme, previous work
showed that an attacker could sometimes infer the website visited by
encrypted HTTP connections even with substantial padding (e.g., [19]).
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Figure 12: Message size (kilo-
bytes) versus verification cost (sec-
onds). Shown are the single-worker
baseline verifier running on TLS 1.2
traffic (•), the single-worker verifier
running on TLS 1.2+ (N), and the
16-worker verifier running on TLS
1.2+ (). TLS 1.2+ includes en-
crypted random padding. Client-to-
server messages (black) and server-to-
client handshake messages (gray) are
also designated.
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Figure 13: Verification lag in sec-
onds for the messages in the high-
volume session of the Gmail data set
with≤ 128 bytes of encrypted random
padding.
Figs. 11–12 show
the performance
of our single- and
16-worker verifiers
on TLS 1.2+ with a
random amount of
encrypted padding.
Fig. 12 shows the
verification cost as a
function of message
size over all 21
Gmail TLS sessions
and, for comparison,
the cost of our base-
line single-worker
verifier running on
a TLS 1.2 client as
previously discussed
in Sec. 7.2. The
addition of random
padding to TLS
1.2+ significantly
enlarges the client
state space that must
be explored. When
the single-worker
verifier is applied
to TLS 1.2+, the
verification cost in-
creases substantially
compared to the TLS
1.2 baseline. The
16-worker verifier
reduces the verifi-
cation cost nearly back to the TLS 1.2 baseline levels.
This demonstrates that the state space search is highly
amenable to parallelization. Again, it is noteworthy, and
perhaps surprising, that in all three cases, the verification
cost is linearly related to message size.
Fig. 13 shows the verification lag on a TLS 1.2+ client
that is sending the high-volume Gmail trace (worst case).
Compared to the single-worker baseline on TLS 1.2, the
single-worker verifier on TLS 1.2+ is unable to keep up
with the Gmail high-volume traffic load, as its verifica-
tion lag continues to increase through the end of the ses-
sion at which point it is over 4 minutes behind. But with
16 workers, the initial lag (maximum of 33s lag) reduces
to near-zero by the 75s mark and the verifier stays in step
with the network traffic for the rest of the session. The
16-worker verifier parallelizes the search well enough to
keep up with a client whose state space is two orders of
magnitude larger than that of the typical TLS 1.2 client.
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8 DISCUSSION
Here we discuss the applications for which our design is
appropriate, and several limitations of our approach.
8.1 Applications
Suitable Application Layers. The application layer
chosen for our TLS evaluation, Gmail, was a relatively
strenuous one in that it exhibited both low-latency inter-
active behavior as well as high-volume data transfer, the
latter of which was challenging as measured by verifica-
tion lag. Other applications that exhibit only one behav-
ior or the other may actually be more amenable to sym-
bolic client verification, not only as an intrusion detec-
tion system, but as an intrusion prevention system.8 For
example, the Extensible Messaging and Presence Pro-
tocol (XMPP) [22], generally used for text-based Inter-
net messaging, is highly interactive but sends relatively
small XML payloads. An average verification cost of
126ms per TLS record may be an acceptable latency for
XMPP. On the other end of the spectrum are bulk data
transfer applications such as the Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol (SMTP). In this case, although the volume of
data to be transferred can be large, the application is
highly tolerant of delay. RFC 5321 recommends that the
retry interval be at least 30 minutes and the give-up time
be at least 4-5 days [17]. Therefore, a larger verifica-
tion lag may be perfectly acceptable for TLS-protected
SMTP connections.
Other Cryptographic Protocols. Perhaps due to its
widespread use in various applications, TLS is one of
the more complex security protocols. We believe that
the client verification technique would likely generalize
to other, often simpler, protocols. One example is Se-
cure Shell (SSH), which includes both authentication and
transport layer protocols [29, 30]. Indeed, SSH is likely
to exhibit application behavior amenable to our verifi-
cation approach. When used as a remote shell, SSH re-
quires low latency but transfers a relatively small amount
of data: key presses and terminal updates. When used for
file transfer (SFTP), a large volume of data is sent, but in
a mode that is relatively latency-insensitive.
8.2 Limitations
Source Code and Other TLS Implementations. Our
verifier requires the client source code to generate LLVM
bitcode and to designate prohibitive functions. We also
8Because of the need for the verifier to obtain the master secret from
the server after the server receives the second client-to-server message
in the TLS handshake, the verifier would need to substitute a fake mas-
ter secret in place of the real one in order to verify the first two client-
to-server messages, if used as an intrusion prevention system. The first
use of the real master secret, which is not evidenced until several mes-
sages later, would then cause the verifier to backtrack, at which point
the real master secret could be inserted.
require knowledge of the client configuration, such as
command line parameters controlling the menu of pos-
sible cipher suites. While this work provides verification
for OpenSSL-based clients, there are several other pop-
ular implementations of TLS, including Mozilla NSS,
GnuTLS, Apple Secure Transport, and Microsoft Schan-
nel. In principle, one could verify a significant portion
of TLS traffic by verifying observed traffic against these
five major TLS libraries, considering a client valid if its
behavior is consistent with any one of them.
Client Versions. A verifier that is validating a client’s
behavior against the wrong version of the client’s im-
plementation could reject a legitimate client falsely. In
App. C, we summarize our initial steps toward verifying
multiple client versions far more efficiently than instan-
tiating a separate verifier for each possible version.
Environment Modeling. While OpenSSL s client
has relatively few interactions with the environment,
other clients may interact with the environment exten-
sively. For example, XPilot interacts with the window-
ing system, and SSH reads /etc/passwd, the .ssh/
directory, redirects standard file descriptors, etc. The
KLEE [6] and Cloud9 [5] POSIX runtimes serve as good
starting points, but some environment modeling is likely
to be necessary for each new type of client. This one-
time procedure per client is probably unavoidable.
Manual Choice of Prohibitive Functions. We cur-
rently choose the set of prohibitive functions manually.
While the choice of cryptographic hash functions, public
key algorithms, and symmetric cipher primitives may be
relatively obvious to a security researcher, this may not
be true for a typical software developer.
Prohibitive Function Assumptions. When prohibitive
functions are initially skipped but eventually executed
concretely, verification soundness is preserved. If a pro-
hibitive function is never executed concretely (e.g., due
to asymmetric cryptography), this introduces an assump-
tion; e.g., in the case of ECDH, a violation of this as-
sumption could yield an invalid curve attack [16]. In a
practical deployment, the user designating a prohibitive
function should also designate predicates on the func-
tion’s output (e.g., the public key is actually a group el-
ement) that are specified by the relevant NIST or IETF
standards as mandatory server-side checks [20] (which
would have prevented the Jager et al. attack [16]). In our
tool, these predicates could be implemented via lazy con-
straint generation (see App. D), or as a klee assume
for simple predicates. Of course, care must be taken
not to turn our verifier into an oracle that enables
Bleichenbacher-type attacks [3].
IDS/IPS Deployment and Denial of Service. Our cur-
rent tool takes as input a recorded network log. To de-
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ploy it as an intrusion detection system (IDS), it would
need to be integrated with a passive network tap. For
latency-tolerant applications, it could even be deployed
as an intrusion prevention system (IPS), where it acts as
a firewall that delivers only verified packets to the server.
In both modes, but especially the latter, we must miti-
gate a potential denial of service (DoS) attack. To do so,
we leverage the strong linear relationship between veri-
fication cost and message size in two ways. (1) Impose a
hard upper bound on verifier time per packet, and declare
all packets that exceed the time budget invalid. Since le-
gitimate packets finish within a few seconds, the bound
can be easily set such that the false alarm rate is negligi-
ble. (2) Given a fixed CPU time budget, precisely com-
pute the amount of traffic that can be verified. The opera-
tor can then allocate verifiers according to the threat pro-
file, e.g., assigning verifiers to high-priority TLS sessions
or ones from networks with poor reputation (e.g., [8]).
The IDS/IPS will then degrade gracefully when total traf-
fic bandwidth exceeds the verification budget.
9 CONCLUSION
We showed that it is possible to efficiently verify that the
messaging behavior of an untrusted cryptographic client
is consistent with legitimate client code. Our technical
contributions are twofold. First, we described a paral-
lel client verification engine that supports concurrent ex-
ploration of paths in the client software to explain a se-
quence of observed messages. This innovation is both
generally useful for client verification and specifically
useful for verifying cryptographic clients, e.g., due to
ambiguities arising from message padding hidden by en-
cryption. Second, we developed a multipass verification
strategy that enables verification of clients whose code
contains cryptographic functions, which typically pose
major challenges to symbolic execution. We demon-
strated our verifier by showing that it detects two attacks
on OpenSSL that represent two classes of client misbe-
havior: those that produce malformed messages (e.g.,
Heartbleed), and those that leverage correctly format-
ted messages that are nevertheless impossible to observe
from a valid client. In addition, we showed that our veri-
fier can keep pace with a typical TLS load (Gmail), run-
ning over both OpenSSL TLS 1.2 and a more complex
simulation of TLS 1.3. We believe our contributions to
be significant in reducing the detection time of a nontriv-
ial class of protocol exploits from years to seconds, with
no prior knowledge of the exploit.
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A DEMONSTRATION OF PARALLELIZA-
TION ON CLIENT-SERVER GAMES
Though our focus in this paper is on cryptographic pro-
tocols, the benefits of the parallel verification architec-
ture described in Sec. 4 extend to other protocols, as
well. To demonstrate this, we employ two game clients
studied in previous work [7], namely XPilot and TetriNet
(specifically XPilot NG v4.7.2 and TetriNet v0.11). The
XPilot client consists of roughly 100,000 SLOC. Beyond
this, the scope of symbolic execution included all needed
libraries except Xlib, whose functions were replaced
with minimal stubs, so that the game could be run with-
out display output. Moreover, uClibc was used in lieu
of the GNU C library. The TetriNet client is 5000 SLOC.
As in XPilot, the scope of symbolic execution also in-
cluded all needed libraries, though again the display out-
put library (ncurses) was disabled using minimal stub
functions and uClibc was used in place of the GNU C
library. The experiments shown here were run on a sys-
tem with 256GB of RAM and 3.2GHz processor cores.
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Figure 14: Verification lag of legitimate TetriNet traces. Box plot at
horizontal-axis value t includes {lag(i) : t ≤ arr(i) < t + 60s} in
20 traces, each starting at time t = 0. “♦” shows the average.
Execution fragments were prioritized by SelectNode as
described in prior work [7].
Fig. 14 shows the distribution of verification lag per
message, binned into 60s bins, across 20 TetriNet traces.
The boxplot labeled t shows the distribution of verifica-
tion lags for messages that arrived between times t and
t + 60s in the 20 traces. In each boxplot, the “box”
shows the first, second (median) and third quartiles, and
its whiskers extend to cover points within±1.5 times the
interquartile range. Additional outlier points are shown
as dots. Overlaid on each boxplot is a diamond (♦) that
shows the average of the data points. In the single worker
configuration (Fig. 14a), verification lags behind mes-
sage arrival times by more than 200s in the worst case. In
contrast, with 16 workers (Fig. 14b), verification is able
to keep pace with gameplay and never accumulates lag
over the course of verification. Even if verification falls
behind at some point in the game, it always catches up
because of the gap between message arrival times. As
such, the verifier should need only a fixed sized buffer of
network messages to manage a long-running verification
session.
In Fig. 15, the verification lags for XPilot are shown
for two worker configurations across 40 message traces.
Despite a mean verification cost of 75ms when using
a single worker thread, the fast pace of XPilot makes
it difficult for verification to keep pace with the game
(Fig. 15a). However, by increasing the number of worker
threads, we can see that in the 8-worker configuration
(Fig. 15b), verification lag never significantly falls be-
hind and could use only a fixed buffer of messages for
verification in long-running sessions. In this case, there
is little additional improvement gained by moving to 16
workers.
B TLS EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In Sec. 7, we applied our client verification algorithm
to OpenSSL, a widely used implementation of Trans-
port Layer Security (TLS) with over 400,000 lines
of code. We configured our OpenSSL client with
one of the currently preferred cipher suites, namely
TLS ECDHE ECDSA WITH AES 128 GCM SHA256.
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Figure 15: Verification lag of legitimate XPilot traces. Box plot at
horizontal-axis value t includes {lag(i) : t ≤ arr(i) < t+ 5s} in 40
traces, each starting at time t = 0. “♦” shows the average.
• Key exchange: Ephemeral Elliptic-Curve Diffie Hell-
man (ECDHE) signed using the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
• Symmetric Encryption: 128-bit Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) in Galois/Counter Mode
• Pseudorandom function (PRF) built on SHA-256
Since our goal was to verify the TLS layer and not the
higher-layer application, in our experiment we took ad-
vantage of the OpenSSL s client test endpoint. This
client establishes a fully functional TLS session, but al-
lows arbitrary application-layer data to be sent and re-
ceived via stdin and stdout, similar to the netcat
tool. Verifying that network traffic is consistent with
s client is roughly equivalent to verifying the TLS
layer alone.
The OpenSSL-specific user configuration for verifica-
tion consisted of the following:
1. Configuring the following OpenSSL functions as
prohibitive: AES encrypt, ECDH compute key,
EC POINT point2oct, EC KEY generate key,
SHA1 Update, SHA1 Final, SHA256 Update,
SHA256 Final, gcm gmult 4bit,
gcm ghash 4bit
2. Configuring tls1 generate master secret as
the function to be replaced by server-side computa-
tion of the symmetric key.
3. (Optional) Declaring EVP PKEY verify to be a func-
tion that always returns success. Performance opti-
mization only.
The user configuration for OpenSSL, comprising decla-
rations of prohibitive functions and their respective in-
put/output annotations, consisted of 138 lines of C code
using our API. Fig. 16 shows an example prohibitive
function declaration for the AES block cipher. In this
macro, we declare the function signature, which com-
prises the 128-bit input buffer in, the 128-bit output
buffer out, and the symmetric key data structure, key,
which contains the expanded round keys. Both in and
DEFINE_MODEL(void, AES_encrypt,
const unsigned char *in,
unsigned char *out,
const AES_KEY *key)
{
SYMBOLIC_CHECK_AND_RETURN(
in, 16,
out, 16, "AESBlock");
SYMBOLIC_CHECK_AND_RETURN(
key, sizeof(AES_KEY),
out, 16, "AESBlock");
CALL_UNDERLYING(AES_encrypt,
in, out, key);
}
Figure 16: Example prohibitive function declaration.
key are checked for symbolic data. If either buffer
contains symbolic data, out is populated with uncon-
strained symbolic data, and the macro returns without
executing any subsequent lines. Otherwise, the under-
lying (concrete) AES block cipher is called.
In a pure functional language or an ideal, strongly
typed language, the prohibitive function specifications
could in principle be generated automatically from the
function name alone. Unfortunately, in C, the memory
regions representing input and output may be accessible
only through pointer dereferences and type casts. This
is certainly true of OpenSSL (e.g., there is no guarantee
that the AES KEY struct does not contain pointers to aux-
iliary structs). Therefore, for each prohibitive function,
the user annotation must explicitly define the data layout
of the input and output.
The domain knowledge required for the first two con-
figuration steps is minimal, namely that current TLS
configurations use the above cryptographic primitives in
some way, and that a symmetric key is generated in a
particular function. The domain knowledge necessary
for the third configuration step is that TLS typically uses
public key signatures only to authenticate the server to
the client, e.g., via the Web PKI. The server itself gener-
ates the signature that can be verified via PKI, and so the
verifier knows that the chain of signature verifications is
guaranteed to succeed. Moreover, this optimization gen-
eralizes to any protocol that uses a PKI to authenticate
the server to an untrusted client.
C MULTI-VERSION VERIFIERS
When the version of the client software used by the ver-
ifier is different from the version of the client software
being run by a legitimate client, it is possible for the ver-
ifier to falsely accuse the client as being invalid. This
poses a challenge for verification when the client ver-
sion is not immediately evident to the verifier. For ex-
ample, OpenSSL does not communicate the minor ver-
sion number of its client to the server, and hence our
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verifier would be in the dark about this version num-
ber. The possibility for false accusations here is real:
we confirmed, for example, that a verifier for OpenSSL
client version 1.0.1e can fail if used to verify traffic for
OpenSSL client version 1.0.1f, and vice versa. This
occurs because, for example, the changes from 1.0.1e
to 1.0.1f included removing MD5 from use and re-
moving a timestamp from a client nonce, not to mention
numerous platform-specific adaptations and bug fixes. In
total, 1.0.1f involved changes to 102 files amounting
to 1564 insertions and 997 deletions (according to git),
implemented between Feb 11, 2013 and Jan 6, 2014.
The immediate solution to this problem is to instanti-
ate a verifier for every possible version that a legitimate
client might be using. By running these verifiers in par-
allel on the message trace from the client, the trace can
be considered valid as long as one verifier remains ac-
cepting of the trace. Running many verifiers in parallel
incurs considerable expense, however.
An alternative approach to address this issue is to
create a single verifier that verifies traffic against sev-
eral versions simultaneously — a multi-version verifier
— while amortizing verification costs for their com-
mon code paths across all versions. To illustrate the
potential savings, we constructed a multi-version ver-
ifier for both 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f by manually as-
sembling a “unioned client” of these versions, say client
“1.0.1ef”. In client 1.0.1ef, every difference in
the code between client 1.0.1e and client 1.0.1f is
preceded by a branch on version number, i.e.,
if (strcmp(version, "1.0.1e") == 0) {
/* 1.0.1e code here */
} else {
/* 1.0.1f code here */
}
We then provided this as the client code to the verifier,
marking version as a symbolic variable. It is im-
portant to note that once the client messages reveal be-
havior that is consistent with only one of 1.0.1e and
1.0.1f, then version will become concrete, caus-
ing the verifier to explore only the code paths for that
version; as such, the verifier still allows only “pure
1.0.1e” or “pure 1.0.1f” behavior, not a combina-
tion thereof.
As shown in Table 1, the single-worker costs (specif-
ically,
∑
i cost(i)) of verifying 1.0.1e traffic with a
1.0.1ef verifier and of verifying 1.0.1f traffic with
a 1.0.1ef verifier were both within 4% of the costs for
verifying with a 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f verifier, respec-
tively. (For these tests, we used the same Gmail traces
used in Sec. 7.) In fact, we do not include lag graphs
for the multi-version verifier here (analogous to those in
Sec. 7) because they are visibly indistinguishable from
Network Trace
Measurement 1.0.1e 1.0.1f
Symbolic branches 32.3% 32.0%
SMT solver queries 7.8% 7.6%
Verification cost 3.0% 3.3%
Table 1: Percentage overhead incurred by verification with a “union”
1.0.1ef client instead of the matching client. Verification cost (time)
is defined in Sec. 7.
those for single-version verifiers. As can be seen from
Table 1, despite a 32% increase in symbolic branches that
in turn drives a 7% increase in SMT solver queries, the
overall cost increases very little. This implies that de-
spite an increase in the number of code path “options”
comprising the union of two versions of client code, the
incorrect paths die off quickly and contribute relatively
little to total verification cost.
While a demonstration of the efficiency of a multi-
version verifier for only two versions of one codebase,
we believe this result suggests a path forward for veri-
fying clients of unknown versions much more efficiently
than simply running a separate verifier for each possibil-
ity. We also anticipate that multi-version verifiers can be
constructed automatically from commit logs to reposito-
ries, a possibility that we hope to explore in future work.
D EXTENSION: LAZY CONSTRAINT
GENERATORS
There are several potentially useful extensions to our
client verification algorithm that we are considering for
future development. Here we highlight one, namely lazy
constraint generators to accompany the designation of
prohibitive functions. Since a function, once specified as
prohibitive, will be skipped by the verifier until its inputs
are inferred concretely, the verifier cannot gather con-
straints relating the input and output buffers of that func-
tion until the inputs can be inferred via other constraints.
There are cases, however, where introducing constraints
relating the input and output buffers once some subset of
them are inferred concretely would be useful or, indeed,
is central to eventually inferring other inputs concretely.
Perhaps the most straightforward example arises in
symmetric encryption modes that require the inversion
of a block cipher in order to decrypt a ciphertext (e.g.,
CBC mode). Upon reaching the client SEND instruction
for a message, the verifier reconciles the observed client-
to-server message msgn with the constraints σ.cons ac-
cumulated on the path to that SEND; for example, sup-
pose this makes concrete the buffers corresponding to
outputs of the encryption routine. However, because the
block cipher was prohibitive and so skipped, constraints
relating the input buffers to those output buffers were not
recorded, and so the input buffers remain unconstrained
by the (now concrete) output buffers. Moreover, a second
18
pass of the client execution will not add additional con-
straints on those input buffers, meaning they will remain
unconstrained after another pass.
An extension to address this situation is to permit the
user to specify a lazy constraint generator along with des-
ignating the block cipher as prohibitive. The lazy con-
straint generator would simply be a function from some
subset of the input and output buffers for the function
to constraints on other buffers. The generator is “lazy”
in that it would be invoked by the verifier only after its
inputs were inferred concretely by other means; once in-
voked, it would produce new constraints as a function of
those values. In the case of the block cipher, the most nat-
ural constraint generator would be the inverse function,
which takes in the key and a ciphertext and produces the
corresponding plaintext to constrain the value of the in-
put buffer.
Our OpenSSL case study in Sec. 5.4 does not re-
quire this functionality since in the encryption mode used
there, the ciphertext and plaintext buffers are related by
simple exclusive-or against outputs from the (still pro-
hibitive) block cipher applied to values that can be in-
ferred concretely from the message. So, once the in-
puts to the block cipher are inferred by the verifier, the
block cipher outputs can be produced concretely, and the
plaintext then inferred from the concrete ciphertexts by
exclusive-or.
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